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 ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this study was to assess the impact of corporate governance on banks 
stakeholders and efficient bank management in Nigeria. The corporate governance variable 
employed in this study was that of board of directors. The two proxies selected for this research 
as independent variables are Board size and Board composition. Whilst the proxy for the 
dependent variable employed was earnings per share since regression only depicts the 
relationship that exist between two variables (x and y). This study made use of secondary data 
obtained from the financial reports of five (5) banks for a period of eight (8) years (2005-2012). 
Secondary data was analysed using Regression while chi-square was used to analyse the 
primary data from bank operators through administered questionnaire.  The results generated 
were found to be similar to that of other previous scholars who have carried out a research on 
the issue of corporate governance and banks profitability.  This study makes a significant 
contribution to research by exposing the importance of corporate governance in the Nigerian 
Banking System. The study supported the hypothesis that corporate governance positively affects 
not only stakeholders but also efficient Bank management. 
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INTRODUCTION 
It is no news that the world has become a global village with continuing speed in technology, 
making the financial sector more open to new products and services in the financial system. To 
ensure conformity with these changes, financial system operators strive to make available 
banking technological gadgets that will enhance operations in the system. Aside the above 
change, the existence of consolidation has a far reaching effect on the banking systems. In line 
with these changes, there is the need for countries to have resilient banking system and strong 
corporate governance. However, lack of compliance with the laid down codes of corporate 
governance by the operators due to some mechanisms in the banking environment, has resulted 
to operational inefficiencies and gross misconduct both at the top management level and the 
lower management level. Also, Weak corporate governance arising from the Board size and its 
composition, weak internal control systems, excessive risk taking, non-adherence to limits of 
authority, disregard for cannons of prudent lending, insider abuses and fraudulent practices 
among others remain a worrisome feature in the management of banking operations in Nigeria. 
 Financial scandals around the world and the recent collapse of major corporate 
institutions in the USA (Enron and WorldCom which is associated with the U.S. federal 
government passing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002, intending to restore public confidence in 
corporate governance) and Europe has brought to the fore, once again, the need for the practice 
of good corporate governance, which is a system by which corporations are governed and 
controlled with a view to increasing shareholder’s value and meeting the expectations of  other 
stakeholders. Also, in developing economies, the banking sector among other sectors has also 
witnessed several cases of collapse, some of which include the Savannah Bank PLC of Nigeria, 
the Continental Bank of Kenya Ltd and Consolidated Bank of Kenya Ltd (Akpan, 2007).  
Given the series of activities that have resulted essentially due to non-compliance with the 
various consolidation policy requirements and the antecedent of disobedience to laws and 
regulation by some of the operators in the financial system, there are concerns on the need to 
strengthen corporate governance in banks.  
In Nigeria, the issue of corporate governance should have been given the front burner status by 
all stakeholders of organisations in the economy. Particularly after the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) set up the Peterside Committee in June, 2000 on corporate governance in 
public companies and the Bankers’ Committees’  sub-committee report  on corporate governance 
for banks and other financial institutions in Nigeria. This is in recognition of the critical role of 
corporate governance in the success or failure of companies (Ogbechie, 2006:6) and the above 
actions was suppose to  boost public confidence and ensure efficient and effective functioning of 
the banking system (Soludo, 2004a).  
 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
The main statements of the problems for this paper are; one: How have the inadequate 
monitoring and supervisions of financial institutions ensured non-compliance with the provisions 
of the code of corporate governance by the regulatory authorities.  
Also, the negligence on the part of board of Directors and audit committee to ensure conformity 
within their area of professional competence, and the performance of their responsibilities to the 
organisations have contributed to poor corporate governance vis-à-vis, bank performance. 
Lastly, how has the Consolidation of the financial sector in 2005 posed additional corporate 
governance challenges for institutional integration processes, information technology and 
cultural harmonization in Nigeria? These and other burning questions have necessitated answers 
and hence the need for this write up. 
 
 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
Generally, the study seeks to explore the relationship between corporate governance structures 
and financial performance in the Nigerian banking industry. However, it was set to achieve the 
following specific objectives:  
1. To investigate the various issues of operational strategies that constitute corporate 
governance challenges, bearing on the performance of Nigerian banks.  
2. To examine how monitoring and supervision of code of corporate governance by the 
regulatory authorities has affected bank management in Nigeria. 
3. To explore the rate at which directors and audit committees have neglected their professional 
jurisdiction in the performance of their responsibilities to the stakeholders in ensuring 
conformity with requirements for accountability and efficiency in the performance of banks 
and 
4. Lastly, find out how the 2005 consolidation exercise pose additional corporate governance 
challenges arising from integration process, information technology and cultural 
harmonization. 
 RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
In view of the above, the questions this study is expected to answer include the following: 
1. To what extent has weak corporate governance in all its ramifications remained a constraint 
to efficient management of banks in Nigeria? 
2. How efficient has the monitoring and supervision by regulatory authorities of code of 
corporate governance ensure compliance by board and management of banks? 
3. To what extent has board of directors and audit committees neglected their duties of ensuring 
conformity with the code of corporate governance through the application of their 
professional competence in the performance  of their responsibilities and what effect has it on 
bank performance? 
4. What impact does consolidation have on corporate governance and bank performance arising 
from the challenges of institutional integration processes, information technology and 
cultural harmonization in Nigeria? 
RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS 
Hypothesis 1 
H0: Weak corporate governance in all its ramifications has no effect on bank performance 
H1: Weak corporate governance in all its ramifications has effect on bank performance 
Hypothesis 2 
H0: Monitoring and supervision of code of corporate governance to ensure compliance by 
regulatory authorities has no effect on efficient bank management. 
H1: Monitoring and supervision of code of corporate governance to ensure compliance by 
regulatory authorities has effect on efficient bank management. 
Hypothesis 3 
H0: Negligence by the board of directors and audit committees in performing their duties has no 
effect on Bank performance. 
H1: Negligence by the board of directors and audit committees in performing their duties has 
effect on Bank performance. 
Hypothesis 4 
H0: Consolidation exercise has no impact on the performance of Banks. 
H1: Consolidation exercise has impact on the performance of Banks. 
 REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 Scholars from different part of the world have different perspectives of what corporate 
governance is or should be.  According to Obi (2009), “corporate governance is a term that refers 
broadly to the rules, processes, or laws by which business are operated, regulated and 
controlled’’. It goes further to explain that the terms can refer to internal factors as defined by the 
stakeholders of the company. An effective and efficient corporate governance that is put in place 
will assist the organisation in achieving its’ objectives, easing operations and impacting 
positively on the market value of the company.  
  However, what is more representative of the concept is the statement that “corporate 
governance refers to a set of rules and incentives by which the management of a company is 
directed and controlled”.  
Corporate Governance as a concept advocates the constitution of a set of encoded laws, 
procedures and rules entrenched to guide the management of organisations for an equitable 
maintenance of balance in the practice and management of the rights and privileges  of all 
stakeholders involved in the corporate organisation, including the supervisory roles, powers and 
privileges of the Board of Directors, management and staff, investors; (including the rights, roles 
and interests of monitory stakeholders), regulatory and governmental control organs toward  
effective performance and achievement of the objectives of the firm in the interest of all 
stakeholders and in compliance with acceptable international standards of practice. 
 According to Kajola (2012), corporate performance is an important concept that relates to 
the way and manner in which financial resources available to an organization are judiciously 
used to achieve the overall corporate objective of an organization, it keeps the organization in 
business and creates a greater prospect for future opportunities. 
Also, the OECD in 1999 defined corporate governance principles as the system by which 
business corporations are directed and controlled. The pillars of good corporate governance have 
been known to shareholder rights, transparency and board accountability. Corporate governance 
is therefore, about building credibility, ensuring transparency and accountability as well as 
maintaining an effective channel of information disclosure that will foster good corporate 
performance. 
There has been no shortage of other crises, such as the secondary banking crisis of the 1970s in 
the United Kingdom, the U.S. savings and loan debacle of the 1980s, East- Asian economic and 
financial crisis in the second half of 1990s (Flannery, 1996). In addition to these crises, the 
history of corporate governance has also been identified from known series of well-known 
company failures: the collapse of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International, Baring Bank 
and in recent times global corporations like Enron, WorldCom, Parmalat, Global Crossing and 
the international accountants, Andersen (La Porta, Lopez and Shleifer 1999).  
Most of these crisis or major corporate failures, which were as a result of incompetence, fraud, 
and abuse, were blamed on lack of business ethics, shady accountancy practices and weak 
regulations. These practices were curbed with new elements of an improved system of corporate 
governance (Iskander and Chamlou, 2000). 
 BASIC PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
For a good and successful practice of corporate governance the world over, its basic and 
commonly accepted principles must be adhered to. These principles include: 
 Rights and Equitable Treatment of Shareholders:  This implies that there are certain 
fundamental rights of the shareholders which organisations must respect and strictly uphold. 
Shareholders should equally be allowed to exercise their rights without fear or favour. 
Organisations are duty bound to give clear interpretation of these rights for better understanding 
by the shareholders as well as ensuring shareholders’ participation in the affairs of the 
corporation through general meetings. 
 Interest of Stakeholders: Corporations are obliged to recognise, in their policies and other 
aspect of operations, their legitimate stakeholders as having legal and other obligations which 
should be fulfilled at all time. 
 Role and Responsibility of the Board of Directors:  As a matter of fact, board members 
should be constituted by people and expertise with the required knowledge. Put differently, 
technocrats of excellent skills and comprehensive understanding should form the board to be 
able to deal with various business issues in order to review and challenge management 
performance. The size of the board should be sufficient enough with appropriate level of 
commitment to fulfil its responsibilities and duties. 
 Disclosure and Transparency: Corporate governance requires high level of accountability, 
hence organisations should make concerted efforts to publicise the roles and responsibilities of 
board and management in order to make them accountable to the shareholders and other 
stakeholders.  Also, there should be a set of procedures to ensure independent verification of the 
company’s financial reporting to safeguard the integrity of the organisation. All investors should 
equally have access to timely and balanced disclosure of materials and factual information 
concerning the organisation. However, to make these principles very effective, certain 
mechanisms have been designed by experts to control and reduce the inefficiencies that could 
arise from moral hazard and adverse selection in relation to corporate governance. For instance, 
the behaviour of managers can be monitored and checked by an independent third party in the 
name of external auditor who attests to the accuracy of the information provided by the 
management to investors. Other mechanisms of control for the effectiveness of these principles 
include: monitoring by the board of directors, internal control procedures and internal auditors, 
balance of power, standard remuneration, competition, takeovers, media pressure and 
surveillance, government regulations and so on. 
 Integrity and Ethical Behaviour: This is quite central to the practice of good governance. It 
involves ethical and responsible decisions making which is necessary in managing risk and 
avoiding lawsuits. Corporate organisations should evolve a clear cut code of conduct to guide the 
conduct of their directors and executives. This enhances their sense of duty and consciousness of 
the interest of all stakeholders. 
 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS 
 Corporate governance mechanisms include a system of controls intended to help align managers' 
incentives with those of shareholders. According to Oman (2001), corporate governance 
mechanisms including accounting and auditing standards designed to monitor managers and 
improve corporate transparency. Furthermore, a number of corporate governance mechanisms 
have been identified analytically and empirically. These, according to Agrawal and Knoeber 
(1996), may be broadly classified as internal and external mechanisms as summarized in Figure 
1 and 2 below: 
Figure 1: Corporate Governance Mechanisms by outsiders 
 
  
 
 
Adapted from Agrawal and Knoeber (199) 
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Adapted from Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) 
Davis, Schoolman and Donaldson (1997, p.23) suggest that governance mechanisms “protect 
shareholders’ interest, minimise agency costs and ensure agent-principal interest alignment”. They 
further opined that agency theory assumptions are based on delegation and control, where controls 
“minimise the potential abuse of the delegation”. This control function is primarily exercised by the 
board of directors. However, in other to address the specific objectives of this research, this study will 
focus on the internal/ insider mechanisms of corporate governance as they relate to banking operations. 
THE ROLE OF INTERNAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS IN BANKS 
PERFORMANCE 
According to the Asian Development Bank (1997), Dallas (2004) and Nam (2004) cited in 
Kashif (2008), various instruments are used in financial markets to improve corporate 
governance and the value of a firm. Economic and financial theory suggests that the instruments 
mentioned below affect the value of a firm in developing and developed financial markets. These 
instruments and their role are as follows: 
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 Debt Holders: Debt factors provide finance in return for a promised stream of payments and a 
variety of other covenants relating to corporate behaviour, such as the value and risk of corporate 
assets. If the corporation violates these covenants or default on the payments, debt holders 
typically could obtain the rights to repossess collateral, throw the corporation into bankruptcy 
proceedings, vote in the decision to reorganize, and remove managers. 
However, there could be barriers to diffuse debt holders to effectively exert corporate 
governance as envisaged. Small debt holders may be unable to monitor complex organization 
and could face the free-rider incentives, as small equity holders. Also, the effective exertion of 
corporate control with diffuse debts depends largely on the efficiency of the legal and bankruptcy 
systems. Large debt holders, like large equity holders, due to their large investment, they are 
more likely to have the ability and the incentives to exert control over the firm by monitoring 
managers.  
Large creditors obtain various control rights in the case of default or violation of covenants. In 
terms of cash flow, they can renegotiate the terms of the loans, which may avoid inefficient 
bankruptcies. The effectiveness of large creditors however, relies importantly on effective and 
efficient legal and bankruptcy systems. If the legal system does not efficiently identify the 
violation of contracts and provide the means to bankrupt and reorganize firms, then creditors 
could lose a crucial mechanism for exerting corporate governance. Also, large creditors, like 
large shareholders, may attempt to influence the AGM voting of the bank by appointing new 
directors to reflect their own preferences. 
 Role of Auditor: The role of auditor is important in implementing corporate governance 
principles and improving the value of a firm. The principles of corporate governance suggest that 
auditors should work independently and perform their duties with professional care. In case of 
any financial manipulation, the auditors are held accountable for their actions as the availability 
of transparent financial information reduces the information asymmetry and improves the value 
of a firm (Bhagat and Jefferis, 2002). 
However, in developing markets auditors do not improve the value of a firm. They manipulate 
the financial reports of the firms and serve the interests of the majority shareholders further 
disadvantaging the minority shareholders. The weak corporate law and different accounting 
standards also deteriorate the performance of the auditors and create financial instability in the 
developing market. 
Role of Chief Executive Officer: The Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of an organization can 
play an important role in creating the value for shareholders. The CEO can follow and 
incorporate governance provisions in a firm to improve its value (Brian, 1997; Defond and Hung, 
2004).  
The decisions of the board about hiring and firing a CEO and their proper remuneration have an 
important bearing on the value of a firm as argued by Holmstrom and Milgrom (1994). The 
board usually terminates the services of an underperforming CEO who fails to create value for 
shareholders. The turnover of CEO is negatively associated with firm performance especially in 
developed markets because the shareholders lost confidence in these firms and stop making more 
investments. It is the responsibility of the board to determine the salary of the CEO and give him 
proper remuneration for his efforts (Monks and Minow, 2001).  
The tenure of a CEO is also an important determinant of the firm’s performance. CEOs are hired 
on short-term contracts and are more concerned about the performance of the firm during their 
own tenure causing them to lay emphasis on short and medium-term goals. This tendency of the 
CEO limits the usefulness of stock price as a proxy for corporate performance (Bhagat and 
Jefferis, 2002). The management of a firm can overcome this problem by linking some 
incentives for the CEO with the long-term performance of the firm (Heinrich, 2002). 
Role of CEO Duality: Similar to the other corporate governance instruments, CEO duality plays 
an important role in affecting the value of a firm. A single person holding both the Chairman and 
CEO role improves the value of a firm as the agency cost between the two is eliminated 
(Alexander, Fennell and Halpern, 1993). However, on the negative side, CEO duality may lead 
to worse performance as the board cannot remove an underperforming CEO and can create an 
agency cost if the CEO pursues his own interest at the cost of the shareholders (White and 
Ingrassia, 1992). 
Role of Managers: Managers can play an important role in improving the value of a firm. They 
can reduce the agency cost in a firm by decreasing the information asymmetry, which results in 
improving the value of a firm (Monks and Minow, 2001). Managers in the developed market 
create agency cost by under and over investment of the free cash flow. Shareholders are 
disadvantaged in this case as they pay more residual, bonding and monitoring costs in these 
firms. 
Role of Board of Directors: The board of directors is an important corporate governance 
mechanism and regarded as the institution where the managers of a company are accountable 
before the law of a company’s activities (Coleman, 2008: 6). Further research has shown that the 
board of directors is effective in monitoring managers. Amongst other functions of the board is 
to select, evaluate and, if necessary, replace the CEO based on performance. Hence, the board of 
directors is the “apex” of decision making in an institution and directors are being held 
responsible for the success and failures of the companies they govern.  
Board Characteristics and Structure; There are many factors or variables that may constitute 
yardsticks by which corporate governance can be measured in an organization. Some of these 
mechanisms under board of directors are briefly discussed below. 
 Board of Directors’ Composition: The composition of board members is also proposed to help 
reduce the agency problem (Weisbach, 1988; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991). The board consists 
of two types of directors; outsider (non executive directors) and insider directors (executive 
directors). The majority of directors in a board should be independent to make rational decisions 
and create value for the shareholders. The role of independent directors is important to improve 
the value of a firm as they can monitor the firm and can force the managers to take unbiased 
decisions. Independent directors can also play a role of a referee and implement the principles of 
corporate governance that protect the rights of shareholders (Bhagat and Jefferis, 2002; Tomasic, 
Pentony and Bottomley, 2003). 
Board Size: Board size plays an important role in affecting the value of a firm. The role of a 
board of directors is to discipline the CEO and the management of a firm so that the value of a 
firm can be improved. Limiting board size to a particular level to ensure coordination and 
tackling of strategic problems among directors in their supervision of management is generally 
believed to improve the performance of a firm, because, the benefits by larger boards of 
increased monitoring are outweighed by the poorer communication and decision making of 
larger groups. 
Board leadership:  This is another key component of the board structure as the leadership tells 
the direction of board meetings, hence the outcomes. In the Nigerian corporate world, an 
independent structure exists where two different individuals serve in the roles of CEO and board 
chairman. A scenario where these two roles are held by an individual brings about the theory of 
CEO duality. CEO duality can lead to accumulation of power in one person thereby vesting all 
powers on a single individual even if the outcome will be negative. However, another school of 
thought does not accept the superiority of the separation of power. From their own perspective 
they see it as a crisis measure for distressed companies. This was shown in a study by 
Dobrzynski (1991). Also, stewardship theory proposes that joint structure leadership provides 
cohesive company lea company leadership that eliminates doubt of the individual leading the 
organisation (Ogbechie & Koufopoulos, 2009) 
 Board diversity: In the global marketplace a company that employs a diverse workforce is 
better positioned to understand the market in which it does business and hence has the capability 
to thrive in such environments. The term diversity refers to a mixture of men and women, people 
from different age brackets, people with different ethnic groups and racial backgrounds.  
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
This paper also attempts to examine some theoretical framework for understanding corporate 
governance issues.                                                          
Sanda and Mikaila and Garba (2005) in their work titled corporate governance mechanisms and 
firm financial performance in Nigeria identified the agency theory, stakeholder theory and the 
stewardship theories as the three prominent theories of corporate governance which are discussed 
below: 
1. STAKEHOLDER THEORY; One of the original advocates of stakeholder theory, Freeman 
(1984), identified the emergence of stakeholder groups as important elements to the organization 
requiring consideration. Freeman further suggests a re-engineering of theoretical perspectives 
that extends beyond the owner-manager-employee position and recognizes the numerous 
stakeholder groups. This theory focuses on the issues of stakeholders in an institution. It 
stipulates that a corporate entity finds procedures or means of ensuring that the interest of the 
shareholders or stakeholders is kept in the balance with those of the bank. However, there is an 
argument that the theory is narrow (Coleman, 2008: 4) because it identifies the shareholders as 
the only interest group of a corporate entity whereas they are other factors like those interested in 
the affairs of such an organisation. 
 The Stakeholders’ Model  
This model is regarded as the most fundamental challenge to the principal-agent model since it 
emphasizes that the purpose of firm should be defined broader than the mere maximization of 
shareholder welfare. Thus, corporate governance should refer to the design of institutions to 
make managers internalize all stakeholders’ welfare (Vives, 2000). Other parties, who have 
interests in the firm’s long-term success, should also be taken into account when a firm’s 
objective function is defined.  These stakeholders include employees, suppliers and customers. 
Supporters of this model believe that this stakeholder approach is more equitable and socially 
efficient (Keasey et al., 1997).  
Donaldson and Preston (1995) provide a diagrammatical representation of the stakeholder 
model, which is reproduced in Figure 3. This diagram reflects the number of groups with 
interests in (or relationships with) the firm. They explained that under this model, all person or 
groups with legitimate interests participating in an enterprise do so to obtain benefits and that 
there is no prima facie priority of one set of interests and benefits over another. 
Figure 3:    The Stakeholder Model 
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 Source: Donaldson and Preston (1995: 69) 
Stakeholder theory offers a framework for determining the structure and operation of the firm 
that is cognisant of the myriad participants who seek multiple and sometimes diverging goals 
(Donaldson and Preston 1995).  Nevertheless, Sundaram and Inkpen (2004a) posit that wide- 
ranging definitions of the stakeholder are problematic. In addition, the authors argue that 
empirical evidence supporting a link between stakeholder theory and firm performance is 
lacking. Finally, identifying a myriad of stakeholders and their core values is an unrealistic task 
for managers (Sundaram and Inkpen, 2004b).  
2. STEWARDSHIP THEORY  
This theory links the success of firms with that of the managers. It tends to argue against the 
agency theory which says that managerial opportunism is not relevant. This theory stipulates that 
a manager’s objective is first to maximise the firm’s value because, a manager’s need of 
achievement and success are met when the firm is doing well (Coleman, 2008: 4). This theory 
addresses the issue of trust which the agency theory refers with respect for authority and 
inclination to ethical behaviour.  
A fall out of this theory is that, it attacks the following areas for effective corporate governance 
in an organisation. The areas include board of directors and leadership issues in a firm. Under the 
board of directors, it is believed that the involvement of the non executive directors is important 
in enhancing the board activities. This is so, because the executive directors have complete 
knowledge of the firm’s operations. Complete participation of non executive directors enhances 
decision making and ensure sustainability of the business. Under leadership, this theory is 
contrary to that of the agency theory. 
Stewardship theory supports the idea that CEO and board chair should be the same individual. 
This is to ensure that decisions are quickly and promptly taken which will surely have impact on 
the firm. Finally, this theory stipulates that small board sizes should be encouraged to enhance 
effective communication and decision making. Nevertheless, the theory does not stipulate how 
an optimal board size should be determined. 
3. AGENCY THEORY; The agency theory has its roots in economic theory and it dominates 
the corporate governance literature. Daily, Dalton and Canella (2003), point to two factors that 
influence the prominence of agency theory. Firstly, the theory is a conceptually simple one that 
reduces the corporation to two participants, managers and shareholders. Secondly, the notion of 
human beings as self-interested is a generally accepted idea. 
In its simplest form, agency theory explains the agency problems arising from the separation of 
ownership and control. It “provides a useful way of explaining relationships where the parties’ 
interests are at odds and can be brought more into alignment through proper monitoring and a 
well-planned compensation system” (Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson, 1997:24). In her 
assessment and review of agency theory, Eisenhardt (1989) outlines two streams of agency 
theory that have developed over time: Principal-agent and positivist. Principal-agent research is 
concerned with a general theory of the principal-agent relationship, a theory that can be applied 
to any agency relationship while a positivist perspective focus on identifying circumstances in 
which the principal and agent are likely to have conflicting goals and then describe the 
governance mechanisms that limit the agent’s self-serving behaviour (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
The fundamental problem of this theory is how the managers follow the interest of the 
shareholders to ensure that agency cost is reduced. Also, the principals are confronted with how 
to select the most capable manager and how to ensure that managers are given the right incentive 
to take decisions that are aligned with shareholders’ interest. Also, the challenge that the 
managers might extract prerequisites (or perks) out of other sources leading them to be less 
concerned about the overall welfare of the firm. 
 The principal-agent or finance model 
The agency relationship explains the association between providers of corporate finances and 
those entrusted to manage the affairs of the firm. The principal-agent model is probably the most 
important model of the corporate governance theory. The underlying premise of this model is 
that shareholders’ residual voting rights should ultimately commit the corporate resources to 
value maximization. 
PRE-REQUISITES FOR EFFECTIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN NIGERIA 
To state categorically, the factors that will ensure good corporate governance in the Nigerian 
banking system will be a huge task. However, given the present operating environment, it is 
essential to explore some factors that are capable of affecting the governance environment.  
In a research by Yakasai (2001) it was agreed that the board is the ultimate governing body 
responsible for the growth of the bank. In view of this, given the level of importance required 
from this body; it goes without saying that there are some qualities which should be inherent in 
board members (Yakasai, 2001: 247). These factors should include the following: knowledge, 
information, strong management, power, independence and time.  
1. Knowledge: Considering the complexity of our financial system which has made the banking 
industry more complicated, it is important to have people of high qualities at the helm of affairs. 
These directors should be from diverse and complementary backgrounds, have knowledge and 
experience, and should network. It is advisable that each board member should have expertise in 
more than one area of specialisation so that the membership will not be unskilled. This will 
ensure that knowledge from board members is broad and deep enough to match the demands 
facing the industry (Yakasai, 2001: 247).  
2. Motivation: Similar to other spheres of business, motivation has remained a key factor in the 
deliverables and outputs of employees. This is the case with board of directors of banks. The 
right incentives and perks should be in place to align bank directors’ interest with those of 
stakeholders they represent. These stakeholders include shareholders, employees and customers 
(Yakasai, 2001: 249).  
The reward system is an effective means that can be used to influence the performance and 
motivation of bank directors. Although the reward system usually extends beyond the amount of 
money paid, it should also include share options for board members.  A downside to this exists 
where intending board members turn their focus to the monetary benefits they will get from 
being nominated. In view of this, it is important that after an attractive package has been offered, 
the nominating committee should have suitable nominees who will be concerned about the 
challenges and not the financial gains. Similar to other spheres of business, motivation has 
remained a key factor in the deliverables and outputs of employees. This is the case with board 
of directors of banks. The right incentives and perks should be in place to align bank directors’ 
interest with those of stakeholders they represent. These stakeholders include shareholders, 
employees and customers (Yakasai, 2001: 249).  
3. Time: This issue relates to two options, one of which is the utilisation of time in board 
meetings and tenures associated with board members. Regarding the issue of tenures of board 
members, it is essential to have staggered retirements which will ensure the presence of 
knowledgeable and experienced directors at any point in time. This adds to the credibility and 
efficiency of the board in duly executing its functions.  The other issue of time is more delicate, 
as it deals with the importance for board members to be very intelligent and experienced people, 
as stated above. However, it is also important that board members prepare properly for meetings 
so that meetings focus on crafting and execution of corporate strategies (Yakasai, 2001: 249). 
4. Information: Information is without doubt the key for board members to be able to work 
effectively and timely, given the spate of events in this present day financial system. Board 
members should have an open door policy to ensure information is received from employees, 
shareholders, customers, regulators and fellow colleagues. The sources of this information 
should be well processed to ensure that boards are not acting on rumours which will 
inadvertently go against the initial intention.  
5. Strong management team: It is imperative to have a management team with relevant 
knowledge and entrepreneurial spirit, core cultures and values for the organisation. However, the 
board should create an enabling environment for this management team to exhibit 
entrepreneurial traits. It is these managers that provide a clear sense of direction for the entire 
organisation since they have a perfect understanding of the internal structures of the bank. 
6. Auditors: In the Nigerian banking landscape, internal auditors as well as external auditors 
exist. The internal auditors are staff members with the entire unit reporting to the chief executive 
officer. The essence of internal auditors is to review internal audit trails and ensure the level of 
exceptions are reduced, depending on when external auditors come to audit the bank. They also 
help to reduce fraud and keep an eye on staff in up country branches, ensuring that the bank’s 
culture is preserved and adhered to. 
 DATA ANALYSIS METHOD 
In analyzing the relationship between corporate governance and financial performance of listed 
banks in Nigeria, regression, chi-square (χ2) and graphical representation will be used by the 
researcher for analysis. This is because the study combined both time series and cross sectional 
data.  
 TOOLS OF ANALYSIS 
The following methods of analysis were employed after the required information was gathered. 
The data that were collected from the administered questionnaires and secondary source were 
processed as follows: 
1. Chi-square (χ2) 
2. Regression analysis 
3. Graphical 
 Chi-square (χ2) test  
Chi-square test is one of the consistent statistical tools used in hypothesis testing. It defines the 
differences between the definite outcome and a priori expectation.  
Also, chi-square distribution formula is adopted because it is by nature non-negative i.e. χ2 =>/O. 
The formula also tends to be positively skewed and very useful for social and management 
science research. The chi-square formula is given as: 
    
      
 
 
Where: 
χ2  =    Chi-square 
∑    =        Summation or sigma  
fo = Observed distribution 
fe = Expected distribution 
To calculate the expected value, the formula is also given as: 
    
                        
           
 
The methods modified to examine data collected were less labour-intensive and more of 
computer aided methods. 
MODEL SPECIFICATION FOR VARIABLES 
The study employs a modified version of the econometric model of Miyajima et al (2003) as 
adopted by Coleman and Nicholas- Biekpe (2006). The Econometric model of Miyajima et al 
(2003) is therefore seen below as; 
Yit = o + 1Git + 2SIZEt + 3BCOMt + et  
Where: 
Yit represents firm performance variables which is earnings per share for banking firms at time t. 
o represents the constant factor 
Git is a vector of corporate governance variables which include: Board Size (BSIZE), Board 
Composition (BCOM) which is defined as the ratio of outside directors to total number of 
directors. 
BSIZEt is the board size of the firm  
BCOMt is board composition of the firm  
et, the error term which account for other possible factors that could influence. 
Based on the fact that we employed different governance and performance proxies, the above 
model is therefore modified to determine the relationship between bank management 
performance and corporate governance of banks in Nigeria.  
The a priori is such that: 
1BOSt; 2BCOMPt > 0. The implication of this is that a positive relationship is expected between 
explanatory variables (1BOSt; 2BCOMPt) and the dependent variable (EPS). The size of the 
coefficient of correlation will help explain various levels of relationship between the explanatory 
variables. 
 Where: EPS represents banks management performance variable which is: Earnings per share 
for banking firms at time t which will be based on the secondary data obtained from the annual 
report of all sampled banks. BSIZE represents the Board Size; Board Composition is represented 
by BCOMP which is defined as the ratio of outside directors to total number of directors. 
et, the error term which account for other possible factors that could influence  EPSit that are not 
captured in the model.  
The primary data obtained from bank operators were used in testing the hypothesis and the 
tool of analysis is chi square produced through Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS). 
The data used for the secondary analysis was pooled from the selected five banks’ annual 
report. 
 CHI-SQUARE TEST  
Table 1: Testing hypothesis one: This is tested base on the associated questions 
in the questionnaire on the outlook of weak corporate governance in all its 
ramifications and bank performance. The questions are basically on the issues of 
weak internal control, board size and board functions. The depicted chi-square 
values in the table below are analysed in the conclusion and summary. 
Test Statistics 
 A B C d E F 
Chi-Square 12.120a 20.588b 17.447c 65.529b 110.941b 63.882b 
Df 4 4 3 4 4 4 
Asymp. Sig. .016 .000 .001 .000 .000 .000 
    Source: Research Data 2013 
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected 
cell frequency is 16.6. 
b. 0 cells (.0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected 
cell frequency is 17.0. 
c. 0 cells (.0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected 
cell frequency is 21.3. 
Table 2: Testing hypothesis two: This is tested base on the related questions in the 
questionnaire on the outlook of monitoring and supervision of code of corporate governance to 
ensure compliance by regulatory authorities’ and efficient bank management. The questions are 
basically on uncoordinated multiplicity of codes, inadequate sanction interpretation and the 
issue of inadequate monitoring. The depicted chi-square values are analysed and conclusion is 
on the summary. Test Statistics 
 a b C d e f g h 
Chi-Square 51.294a 36.518b 30.059c 87.882a 14.471a 67.765a 63.847c 60.647c 
Df 4 2 3 4 4 4 3 3 
Asymp. Sig. .000 .000 .000 .000 .006 .000 .000 .000 
     Source: Research Data 2013 
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected cell frequency 
is 17.0. 
b. 0 cells (.0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected cell frequency 
is 28.3. 
 CHI-SQUARE TEST  
Table 1: Testing hypothesis one: This is tested base on the associated questions 
in the questionnaire on the outlook of weak corporate governance in all its 
ramifications and bank performance. The questions are basically on the issues of 
weak internal control, board size and board functions. The depicted chi-square 
values in the table below are analysed in the conclusion and summary. 
Test Statistics 
 A B C d E F 
Chi-Square 12.120a 20.588b 17.447c 65.529b 110.941b 63.882b 
Df 4 4 3 4 4 4 
Asymp. Sig. .016 .000 .001 .000 .000 .000 
    Source: Research Data 2013 
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected 
cell frequency is 16.6. 
b. 0 cells (.0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected 
cell frequency is 17.0. 
c. 0 cells (.0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected cell frequency 
is 21.3. 
Table 3: Testing hypothesis three: This is tested base on the related questions in the 
questionnaire on the outlook of negligence by the board of directors and audit committees in 
performing their duties and Bank performance. The questions are basically on post 
consolidation issues and its effects on banks performance. The depicted chi-square values are 
in table 4. and conclusions are analysed on the summary. 
Table 4: Testing Hypothesis four: This is tested base on the related questions 
in the questionnaire on the viewpoint of negligence by the board of directors 
and audit committees in performing their duties and Bank performance. The 
questions are basically on board negligence and its effects on banks 
performance. The depicted chi-square values in the table below are analysed 
in the conclusion and summary. 
Test Statistics 
 A B C d e F f 
Chi-Square 21.647a 44.494b 66.671c 34.000a 65.541c 114.471a 39.376c 
Df 4 2 3 4 3 4 3 
Asymp. Sig. .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
    Source: Research Data 2013 
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum 
expected cell frequency is 17.0. 
Test Statistics 
 a B C D e 
Chi-Square 15.529a 1.259b 18.941a 20.706a 12.824a 
Df 4 3 4 4 4 
Asymp. Sig. .004 .739 .001 .000 .012 
   Source: Research Data 2013 
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The 
minimum expected cell frequency is 17.0. 
b. 0 cells (.0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The 
minimum expected cell frequency is 21.3. 
b. 0 cells (.0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum 
expected cell frequency is 28.3. 
c. 0 cells (.0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum 
expected cell frequency is 21.3. 
Test Statistics 
 E I J K 
Chi-Square 114.471a 39.694b 36.729b 64.224c 
Df 4 2 2 3 
Asymp. Sig. .000 .000 .000 .000 
  Source: Research Data 2013 
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum 
expected cell frequency is 17.0. 
b. 0 cells (.0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum 
expected cell frequency is 28.3. 
c. 0 cells (.0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum 
expected cell frequency is 21.3. 
Based on the above report from table 4.8 of the chi-square analysis done through (SPSS) 
computer analytic package, however, before the hypothesis related to the objectives of this 
research is tested, the derived evidence will be specified and analysis will be done through the 
non- parametric test of Chi-square on the tables above; 
Probability Value (p- Value) = 0.000 
Level of Significance (α) = 0.05 or 95% 
 The χ2 test is an important extension of hypothesis testing and is used when it is wish to 
compare an actual/observed distribution with a hypothesized or expected distribution. 
From the table above, the χ2 is calculated based on the following assumption: 
Confidence interval of 95%. 
Significance level of 5% 
Degree of freedom (r-1) (c-1) 
Where  r = number of rows 
  c = number of columns  
:. Degree of freedom = (r-1) (c-1) 
The test by the probability distribution P-value (0.00) confirmed that the research hypothesis 
(H0) should be rejected at 5% level of significance based on the fact that p-value 0.000< 0.05(α). 
Therefore the null hypothesis H0 (research hypothesis) will be rejected while we accept the 
alternative hypothesis H1, that there is significant impact of corporate governance on banks 
management performance. Regression Analysis 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .220a .048 -.003 110.80718 
Source: Research Data 2013 
a. Predictors: (Constant), BCOM, BSIZE 
 
Regression coefficient was used to test if there is any significant relationship between earnings 
per share (criterion/dependent variable) and board of Directors (predictor/independent variables). 
The ordinary least square regression analysis was used. The result from the analysis shows that a 
low relationship exists between board of directors and earnings per share. This is depicted by the 
R value of 0.97. The coefficient of determination (R
2
) is 0.048 which shows that only 4.9% per 
cent of the variations in the performance of banks selected were explained by the independent 
variable. 
  
 
 
 
From the above table, the significant value (p value) is 0.401, which shows that the 
regression model derived could not be relied upon for prediction over and above 99 
per cent confidence level. However, using 5% level of significance (alpha α) and 
since alpha is less than p value (table above 0.401) we conclude that the board size 
and composition has positive weak effect on the banks performance. The p value 
(0.401) above the level of significance (α) indicates that the model fails to explain a 
lot of variation in earnings per share. 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
T Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -27.562 86.618  -.318 .752 
BOARD SIZE 7.400 5.782 .206 1.280 .209 
BOARD COMPOSITION -19.936 33.572 -.096 -.594 .556 
Source: Research Data 2013 
a. Dependent Variable: EPS 
From the table above, the sig.value is 0.209 and 0.556 for BSIZE and BCOM respectively this 
shows that board size and board composition of bank has positive weak relationship on banks 
management performance (EPS). A change in board size will bring change in EPS by 7.4 while 
composition is -19.936 
Conclusion 
Regression Equation termed as the specification model i.e. Y = α + Β1x1 + B1X2 
Y =-19.936 - 27.562 X1  + 7.400 X2  
 
ANOVAb 
Model Sum of Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 23007.758 2 11503.879 .937 .401a 
Residual 454294.582 37 12278.232   
Total 477302.339 39    
Source: Research Data 2013 
a. Predictors: (Constant), BCOM, BSIZE 
b. Dependent Variable: EPS 
Therefore, a change of 1 in x (i.e. BSIZE and BCOM) means a change of 7.4X1 and -19.936X2 in 
Y (i.e. EPS). Also, R
2 
= 0.048 
It shows that Y can explain about 48% of the variation in independent variable X and 
R = 0.22 which shows that there is a positive weak relationship between board size, board 
composition and earnings per share. This weak relationship is justified by the large size of the 
boards of the relative banks in the study. The larger the sizes of the boards of directors the more 
the possibility of the weakness and ineffectiveness of their policies and decisions.  
 FINDINGS OF THE STUDY 
The analysis above was carried out using secondary data obtained from annual accounts of 
selected banks (First Bank of Nigeria, Access, United Bank for Arica, Diamond and Eco Bank) 
and the administered questionnaire. The obtained secondary data was analysed using the model 
specified above. EPS were used in the study as the dependent variable while Board size and 
Board composition were used as the independent variables. 
From the regression analysis, we have 5% level of significance, that is 100(1-a) %. 
Where a =0.05 
Alpha level = 0.95 
Since the F cal >F tab (i.e. F calculated and F tabulated respectively) we therefore reject the null 
hypothesis H0 and accept the alternative hypothesis H1 and conclude that there is weak positive 
impact of corporate governance on banks performance. Basing our conclusion on the used 
dependent and independent variables we conclude that BSIZE and BCOM has weak positive 
impact on EPS of which is in line with other research works in this area of study. 
The chi-square analysis carried out on the administered questionnaires to bank operators, H0 was 
rejected while H1 was accepted since the Xtab > the Xcal. Hence, we conclude that corporate 
governance has weak positive impact on banks’ performance. 
However, results of primary data analysis can be concluded as follows: 
1. Weak corporate governance in all its ramifications has effect on bank performance. This is in 
conformity with the first hypothesis and it accepts the alternative hypothesis that Weak corporate 
governance in all its ramifications has effect on bank performance. 
2. Monitoring and supervision of code of corporate governance to ensure compliance by 
regulatory authorities has effect on bank performance. This finding supports the alternative 
hypothesis that states that inadequate monitoring and supervision of code of corporate 
governance to ensure compliance by regulatory authorities has effect on bank performance. 
3. Negligence by the board of directors and audit committees in performing their duties has 
effect on Bank performance. This result supports the third hypothesis by accepting the alternative 
hypothesis that Negligence by the board of directors and audit committees in performing their 
duties has effect on Bank performance. 
4. Consolidation exercise has impact on the performance of Banks. This supports the fourth 
hypothesis and accepts the null hypothesis that it has Consolidation exercise has impact on the 
performance of Banks 
 SUMMARY  
The survival and stability of any institution of the financial sector depend on the quality of its 
compliance with the codes of corporate governance. In spite of several reforms initiated to 
strengthen this sector, banks are still prone to failure.  This is because both the board and 
management of banks have always been resistant to policy provisions and regulatory guidelines. 
The loss associated with this failure is enormous on their reputation, efficiency and industrial 
growth. Hence, the strong need for increased enforcement of compliance of corporate bodies 
with the provisions of the ethics of corporate governance codes becomes imperative. Corporate 
governance is considered to involve a set of complex indicators, which face substantial 
measurement error due to the complex nature of the interaction between governance variables 
(such as board size, board composition, etc.) and firm performance indicators. Nevertheless, 
previous empirical studies have provided the link between corporate governance and firm 
performance. However, despite the volume of the empirical work, there is no consensus on the 
impact of corporate governance on bank performance. Consequently, this lack of consensus has 
produced a variety of ideas (or mechanisms) on how corporate governance influence bank 
performance.  
 CONCLUSION 
The essence of this study was to determine the impact of corporate governance on banks’ 
performance in Nigeria between 2005 and 2012. The study has been able to show that the 
Nigerian banking sector is affected by the level of corporate governance culture being embraced. 
Two broad classes of board were used, namely board composition and board size. Hypothesis 
was set up against return on assets and earnings per share based on the secondary data obtained 
from the annual report of banks. Also, primary data obtained from a number of randomly 
selected banks through administered questionnaire were used and hypotheses were tested using 
chi-square. 
 From the study base on the result of the analysis, it showed that corporate governance variables 
such as board directors have impact on the performance of banks. However, the study established 
a weak relationship between EPS and board composition. Board composition equally showed a 
weak positive relationship with earning per share which means there is a decrease in the 
performance of the banks whenever there is an increase in the number of independent directors 
on the list of board of directors. The board size shows a weak positive relationship with earnings 
per share which means that there is an increase in the performance of the bank when the board 
size is at minimal, and increase in the performance of bank will increase the level of their service 
delivery to customers. 
Furthermore, the hypothesis tested from the administered questionnaire which is basically set 
towards solving the research problems and the result of the analysis indicated that corporate 
governance has significant impact on banks performance in Nigeria just as identified by the 
secondary data analysed. Generally, the result showed that the banks are relatively better in 
implementing the corporate governance practices.  
 RECOMMENDATIONS 
From the findings, the following recommendations are to be considered to address the observed 
issues; 
i. The board size of banks in Nigeria should not be too large (since it is part of the code of 
corporate governance requirement by both CBN and NDIC) and must be made up of qualified 
professionals who are conversant with oversight function and the issue of transparency, 
accountability and disclosure by banks should be taken more seriously. 
ii.  Through the administered questionnaires, banks acknowledge the practice of corporate 
governance and compliance with its codes in their establishment. However, based on the 
findings, it is necessary that banks should set up more committees that will improve or facilitate 
good corporate governance in order to checkmate corruptions in banking system in Nigeria. 
iii. Most of the operators in banks have little or no knowledge of corporate governance; this was 
discovered during the researcher’s data sourcing period. Hence, awareness creation among banks 
should be conducted to ensure compliance with code of corporate governance. 
iv. Harmonization of the various codes of corporate governance has become urgently very necessary 
in the system and should be encouraged to ensure single reporting authority and a unified 
corporate body saddled with the responsibility of collecting and collating corporate governance 
related data and constructing the relevant indices to facilitate corporate governance research in 
Nigeria should be set up.  
v. Based on the review of related literature, efforts to improve corporate governance should focus 
on the value of the stock ownership of board members, since it is positively related to both future 
operating performance and to the probability of disciplinary management turnover in poorly 
performing banks.  
vi. Steps should also be taken for mandatory compliance with the code of corporate governance. 
Also, an effective legal framework should be developed that specifies the rights and obligations 
of a bank, its directors, shareholders, specific disclosure requirements and provide for effective 
enforcement of the law. 
vii. Finally, In order to address failures of corporate governance in the industry, the CBN should 
establish a specialist function focusing on governance issues to ensure governance best practices 
are embedded in the industry also, the reform programme should be able to strengthen corporate 
governance in both banks and financial institutions and they should have an embedding culture 
across the industry that good governance is good business. 
 
 
AREAS OF FURTHER RESEARCH  
Due to the importance of corporate governance on organisational management, recent trend has 
revealed that to achieve corporate success and economic growth,   it can no longer be ignored or 
underestimated. To further explore the relationship between corporate governance and a bank’s 
management and economic performance, the following have been identified as areas for further 
research.  
i. Analysing the impact of uncoordinated multiplicity of codes from regulatory authorities on the 
bank’s profitability, will help to determine whether it should be encouraged in the system or not 
and will equally depict whether it has been a contributing factor to neglecting corporate 
governance by banks in Nigeria. 
ii. Banks are generally hesitant to release data of their operational activities , research results 
accuracy are not guaranteed; hence it will be imperative to confirm if board composition has any 
correlation on profitability of banks in Nigeria.   
Finally, analysing the impact of board activity and audit committee, intensity on the banks’ 
profitability will also be helpful to further studies into the performance of the Nigerian banking 
sector.  
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